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C hoosing the Law Governing Perfection: 
Th~ Da ta and Politics of Article 9 Filing 
SKev,en L. Harris 
Charles W. 1\f!ooney. Jr.* 
In his valuable contribution to this Symposium, Lynn 
LoPucki makes a case for revising Article 9 to provide that the 
proper place for filing a financing statement against a corporate 
debtor is the jurisdiction under whose law the debtor is incorpo-
rated.1 He marshals data that provide powerful support for his 
proposal and effectively blunt anticipated criticisms. We are 
:pleased to see this article, not only because we are inclined to 
agree with its conclusion, but also because its appearance sup-
pOl~ts one of the strengths of the UCC revision process. 
As LoPucki acknowledges, his article is a direct outgrowth 
of a process that began with the establishment of the Permanent 
Editorial Board UCC Article 9 Study Committee.2 He first pub-
licly floated the idea of an incorporation-based choice-of-law rule 
* The authors are, respectively, Professor of Law, University of illinois 
College of Law, and Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. 
They serve as Reporters for the Drafting Committee to Revise UCC Article 9 
("Drafting Committee") and were the Reporters for the Permanent Editorial 
Board UCC .A_rticle 9 Study Committee ("Study Committee"). The views ex-
pressed in this paper are not necessarily those of the Drafting Committee, the 
Study Committee, or any of the sponsors of either (the Permanent Editorial 
Board, the American Law Institute, or the National Conference of Commission-
ers on Uniform State Laws). 
1. Lynn M. LoPucki, Why the Debtor's State of Incorporation Should Be 
the Proper Place for Article 9 Filing A Systems Analysis, 79 MINN. L. REv. 577 
(1995). Although LoPucki's proposal encompasses not only corporations but 
also limited partnerships, limited liability companies, and other chartered enti-
t ies {"registered entities"), his discussion proceeds primarily in the context of 
corporate debtors. Id. at 581. We follow his practice. 
2. Id. at 583-84. The Permanent Editorial Board established the Study 
CoD:l.!-nit t<:e in early 1990. PERMANENT EDITORIAL BoARD FOR THE UNIFORM CoM-
MERCIAL CoDE, PEB STUDY GRouP, UNIFORM CoMMERCIAL CoDE .A..RTICLE 9: RE-
PORT 1 (1992) [hereinafter FEB REPORT]. The Report describes the reasons for 
and background of the study and the organization, operation, and general ap-
proach of the Committee. I d. at 1-9. The Study Committee recommended that 
the U CC's sponsors create a drafting committee for the revision of Article 9. I d. 
at 10-11. The sponsors responded positively and created the Drafting Coilll.-nit-
te :: in 1993 . We expect that a revised .Article 9 \Vill be promulgated in 1997. 
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in May 1993, at an Invitational Symposium sponsored by the 
American Law Institute-American Bar Association Committee 
on Continuing Professional Education. LoPucki was among a 
select group of established and knowledgeable practitioners and 
academics who were invited to participate in a wide-ranging dis-
cussion of the Study Committee's Report. 3 The primary pur-
poses of the Report were to recommend to the sponsors of the 
UCC whether Article 9 is in need of revision and, if so, to recom-
mend the nature and substance of the revisions.4 But, as 
LoPucki's article suggests, the Report served as well to stimu-
late discussion of various proposals for revision. 5 
IMPROVING UPON ARTICLE 9's BIFURCATED 
CHOICE-OF-LAW RULE 
The Study Committee's Report expressed dissatisfaction 
with the current choice-of-law system. Under this system, the 
law of the jurisdiction where the collateral is located governs 
perfection for most tangible collateral, whereas the law of the 
jurisdiction where the debtor is located governs perfection for 
most intangibles.6 In explaining the desirability of a single 
choice-of-law rule applicable to both tangible and intangible col-
lateral, the R eport observed that following two rules often re-
sult s in multiple filings for a single transaction. 7 The two-rule 
regime also jeopardizes security interests in proceeds and cre-
ates priority problems that a single rule would minimize and, in 
some cases, even eliminate. 8 
3. Because LoPucki is widely regarded as not terribly sympathetic to se-
cured cr editors, the mixed reaction his idea received is some indication that the 
alleged "capture" of the revision process by representatives of secured parties is 
overstated. 
4. PER REPORT, supra note 2, at 1. 
5. LoPucki, supra note 1, at 584. Discussions are continuing under the 
auspices of the American Bar Association and the American Law Institute, 
tr,.rough the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 
an d various state and local bar associations, as well as among the advisors and 
observers of the Drafting Committee. 
6. "A debtor shall be deemed located at his place of business if he has one, 
at his chief execut ive office if he has more than one place of business, otherwise 
at his :residence." U.C.C. § 9-103(3)(d) (1990). 
7. PEB REPORT, supra note 2, at 75. For example, financiers commonly 
take a security interest in both inventory and accounts. The law of the location 
of the collateral governs wher e to file a financing statement with respect to in-
ventmy. U.C .C. § 9-103(1)(b). The law (including the conflict-of-laws rules) of 
the jurisdiction wher e the debtor is located governs where to file v.ith respect to 
0\cccunts . Id . § 9 -103(3)(b). 
8. PEB R EPORT, supra note 2, at 75. 
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Several considerations led the Study Committee to conclude 
that the singleehoice-of-law rule should turn on the location of 
the debtor and not the location of the collateral.9 First, intangi-
ble collateral has no location. A location-of-collateral rule would 
require a provision fixing a fictional location for intangibles.lo 
Second, collateral may be located in many jurisdictions, whereas 
each debtor has only one location (and, perhaps, one or two other 
candidates for its location). As a consequence, a debtor's-loca-
tion rule would likely result in fewer filings, thereby lowering 
the cost of credit. Third, a debtor's-location rule probably would 
not need special provisions governing collateral in transit. 11 Fi-
nally, because debtors are unlikely to change locations as fre-
quently as does collateral, a debtor-based rule would likely 
reduce the costs of maintaining perfected status and the fre-
quency with which certain difficult priority issues arise. 
The Report candidly acknowledged that a single choice-of-
law rule based on the location of the debtor is not a complete 
solution to choice-of-law problems, even though it would reduce 
many costs and much complexity.l2 Because debtors sometimes 
change their location, a debtor-based rule would not eliminate 
all the costs and priority problems that accompany or result 
from changes in the fact that determines the applicable law. 
The Report also identified several problems that might accom-
pany a shift from the current mixed choice-of-law regime (collat-
eral- and debtor-based, depending on the type of collateral) to a 
single, debtor-based rule.1 3 
CHOICE-OF-LAvV BASED ON THE JURISDICTION OF THE 
DEBTOR'S INCORPORATION 
LoPucki approves of and builds upon the Study Committee's 
recommendations that Article 9 be revised to provide a single 
choice-of-law rule and that the rule be tied to the debtor, rather 
than the collateral.l4 He brings to the discussion a new and im-
9. Id. at 76. 
10. A rule that located intangibles at the debtor's location would 1·eplicate 
the existing system. 
11. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-103(1)(c) (governing purchase money security in-
terests in collateral that the parties understand will be kept in another state). 
12. PEB REPORT, supra note 2, at 77. 
13. I d. We discuss some of these problems. See infra notes 34-59 and ac-
companying text (discussing the variety of adverse implications associated with 
the change to a debtor-based rule). 
14. PEB REPORT, supra note 2, § 9.A. The Study Committee's recommen-
dations were not novel. They were in accord with those of others 'Yvho previ-
ously had considered the issue. See, e.g.) RusSELL J. vVEINTRAU B, COMMENTARY 
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portant twist, suggesting that the governing law be that of the 
jurisdiction under whose law the debtor is incorporated rather 
than the jurisdiction in which the debtor's chief executive office 
is located.l5 LoPucki does not limit his analysis to the question 
of whether an incorporation-based choice-of-law rule is prefera-
ble to one based on the location of the debtor's chief executive 
office . . His paper also illuminates the larger question of the de-
sirability of switching from a mixed choice-of-law regime to a 
single choice-of-law rule. 
At least insofar as it relates to the law governing pe:rfec-
tion,16 this larger choice-of-law question is, in turn, but one as-
pect of an overriding issue in the revision process: How to 
minimize the aggregate costs of the filing system.17 LoPucki's 
principal claim is that "[t]he benefits of the change to a n incorpo-
ration-based sysem will be principally in the form of lower total 
systems costs and greater accuracy," and his proposal should be 
assessed on this basis.l8 We do not share LoPucki's concern that 
a particular rule might permit filers to externalize certain costs 
by shifting them to searchers, or vice versa. 19 As a practical 
matter, filers, searchers, and debtors are unable to bargain 
among themselves to reallocate the costs of the filing system. 
Regardless ofhow Article 9 allocates the costs between :filers and 
searchers, each group can shift the loss to its customers. Ulti-
mately, debtors and potential debtors will bear both the costs of 
ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS§ 8.42, at 503-04 (3d ed. 1986) (promoting th8 merits 
of a debtor-based rule); Peter F. Coogan, The New UCC Article 9, 86 I-IAKv. L. 
REv. 477 , 556-57 (1973) (arguing that a debtor-based rule would eliminate 
problems creat ed by the location-of-collateral approach); Friedrich K. Juenger, 
Nonpossessory Security Interests in American Conflicts Law, 84 CoM. L .J. 63 , 74 
(1979) (advocating a debtor-based rule except for cars or fixtures). 
15. LoPucki contrasts his proposal, filing "where the debtor is incorp o-
rated," with the current regime, under which one files "where the debtor is lo-
cated" or ·\vhere the collateral is located." LoPuc:!r..i, supra note 1, at 585-93. 
Because the location of a corporation is a legal l'iction, we would pl:1rase the 
issue in terms of whether A...rticle 9 should deem a corporation to be kcated at 
its chief 8xecutive office or in the jurisdiction of its incorporation. 
16. Under § 9-103, the law governing perfection of secm·ity illt8l·ests als o 
governs "the effect of perfection," wr..ich many understand t o m ean the relative 
priority of a security interest as against other claims to the collateral. U.C.C. 
§ 9-103(6) (1994). A 199L1 amendment to § 9-103(6) distinguishes between <;h;:; 
law governing perfection and the law goven•ing pr iority •Nith n;spect to s.scuri·· 
ties. ld. 
17. The aggregate costs include those imposed upon both s 2cu.:red and \.CD-
secm-.ed creditors, as well as upo11 buyers and transferees of the colJc::,.tel"al and 
other interested persons who consult the UCC filing records . 
18. See LoPucki, supra note l , at 652. 
19. See id. at 601. 
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filing (or choosing not to file) and the costs of searching (or decid-
ing not to search) . No advantage is necessarily gained by creat-
ing rules that, in the first instance, impose upon the filer the 
costs of its own errors. The goal instead becomes one of reducing 
the aggregate costs of both aspects of the filing system. 
Cost reduction is not the only goal of the revision process. 
The nurnose of the National Conference of Commissioners on 
Unif~rm~State Laws (NCCUSL), one ofthe sponsors ofthe UCC, 
is "to promote uniformity in the law among the several 
States."2 0 Especially in light of the general acceptance of ex-
isting Section 9-103,21 the Article 9 Drafting Committee is un-
likely to approve any change to the section that it believes is 
likely to impair significantly the chances of enactment or to re-
sult in non-uniform amendments.22 
The Study Committee's Report outlines some of the poten-
tial cost savings that might result from switching to a single 
choice-of-law rule determined by the location of the debtor's 
chief executive office. LoPucki argues, in essence, that an incor-
poration-based choice-of-law rule would afford all the benefits of 
:movi ng to a chief executive office rule and then some. 
Th2 advantages of linking the location of a corporate debtor 
to its jurisdiction of incorporation rather than to its chief execu-
tive office cannot be denied. Once one has identified the debtor, 
the ju.:risdiction of incorporation is certain and easy to confirm 
from the public :record; the location of the chief executive office is 
less certain and depends on private facts that may be costly to 
,,~Ari Pv 23 . _,_ - - ~- .; . 
20. CoNSTITUTION OF THE NATIONAL CoNFERENCE oF CoMMISSIONERS ON 
UNIFORM STATE LAWS § 1.2 (1988). 
21 . There have been very few nonuniform amendments to § 9~103. 
22. .A crwng NCCUSL's policies is the following: "(a) Every act drafted by 
th2 Conference shall conform to the following r equirements: ... (2) there shall 
b.~ a rea sonable probability that the act, when appr oved, either will be accepted 
a:nd : :nacted into law by a substan tial number of jurisdictions or, if not, will 
pTomot e uniformity indirectly." NATIONAL CoNFERENCE OF CoMMISSIONERS ON 
U NIFORM STATE LAws, STATEMENT oF PoLicY EsTABLISHING CRITERIA AND PRO-
CEDURE S FOR DESIGNATION AND CoNSIDERATION OF AcTs '!! 2(a)(2) (1988). To the 
.:G~tent that nommiformity imposes net costs , the goal of uniformity is one as ~ 
p 2ct of the goal of cost reduction. 
23. LoPucki m akes much of this uncertainty, some of which the official 
comDJ21T~ creates. LoPucki, supra note 1, at 594-97. The Study Committee's 
Report aelr..nowledged the uncertainty but observed that "[a ]lthough the term 
[chi:?? e~~scutive office] is not defined, the lack of definition does not appear to 
ha·I2 C8.usecl sig:.rJi:iJ.cant problems ." PEB REPORT, supra note 2, at 76 n .8. Pre~ 
.:ouio.a.bJy, t}1e un certainty, what ever its degTee, could be ameliorated by care-
(\."t)Jy reclca?ting t h e statute and the official comments. Nevertheless , LoPucki's 
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POST-TRANSACTION CHANGES UNDER AN 
INCORPORATION-BASED CHOICE-OF-LA\V RULE 
The incorporation-based system may not be quite so simple 
as it first appears. For example, the rule may have to take ac-
count of corporations that dissolve. Because the consequences of 
dissolution differ from state to state, a complex provision may be 
needed to deal with the variations. As LoPucki suggests, an in-
corporation-based choice-of-law rule is likely to be useful not 
only for corporations but also for other "registered entities."24 
More thought must be given to the applicability of the "jurisdic-
tion of incorporation" rule to entities other than state-chartered 
corporations. 25 In particular, care must be taken to assure that 
no "registered entity" can be chartered by more than one juris-
diction. And, unless Congress establishes a federal filing system 
for federally chartered entities, the choice-of-law rule governing 
security interests created by some registered entities will differ 
from that governing security interests created by others.26 In 
any event, the definition of "registered entity" will raise some 
questions at the margin. These and other issues deserve further 
study; we suspect, however, that they will prove trivial when 
compared with the increased certainty that would result from 
abandoning the chief executive office as a determinant of the ap-
plicable law. 
We agree with LoPucki that the costs of discovering andre-
sponding to changes in the jurisdiction whose law governs 
perfection are likely to be lower in an incorporation-based sys-
tem than under a rule that turns on the location of the debtor's 
chief executive office. A change in the jurisdiction of incorpora-
tion is a matter of public record and occurs at a definite time.27 
point is well taken: The jurisdiction of incorporation is more certain and easier 
to verify than is any undefined "chief executive office" or any redefined "chief 
executive office." 
24. For a worbng definition of "registered entity," see LoPucki, supra note 
1, at 581 n.12. 
25. The 1977 amendments to§ 9-103 use the phrase "jurisdiction of organi-
zation." See D.C. C. § 9-103(6) (1977). One of the nevv choice-of-law provisions 
applicable to securities uses the phrase "jurisdiction under which the issuer of 
the security is organized." U.C. C. § 8 -llO(d) (1994). 
26. It will be necessary to specify the applicable law in the case offederally-
chartered entities. We fb.ink it unlikely, however, that states would adopt a 
uniform text that deems a specified jurisdiction (say, Washington, D.C.) to be 
the home of all federally-chartered entities. A...rwther alternative for fede rally-
ehartered entities would be the jurisdiction where the chief executive office is 
located, as under current UCC § 9-103(3). 
27. Following LoPucki , we use the pr..rase "change in the jurisdiction of in-
corporation" to refer to a reincorporation. Although the purpose and practical 
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A debtor may change its chief executive office through the accre-
tion of otherwise insignificant private events, thus making the 
moment of change-a legally significant event-impossible to 
pinpoint. 28 An incorporation-based rule may reduce signifi-
cantly the monitoring costs that arise from the current need to 
reperfect if the debtor relocates its chief executive office or 
reincorporates. 29 
To some degree, our assessment of these monitoring costs 
differs from LoPucki's. For example, we agree that an incorpo-
ration-based rule could eliminate the need to monitor for corpo-
rate restructurings, but we think that revisions to Article 9 
would be insufficient to accomplish that goal. LoPucki assumes 
that the change in choice-of-law rules would be accompanied by 
a revised section 9-402(7), under which a filed financing state-
ment would remain effective if the debtor corporation changes 
its name or even merges out of existence. 30 He suggests that 
this new rule would eliminate the need for a secured party who 
files properly in the jurisdiction of incorporation to monitor for 
subsequent mergers. 31 But a merger, particularly one in which 
the debtor merges out of existence, poses risks that may dwarf 
the loss of perfected status. Even if a filing were to remain effec-
tive following a reincorporation, secured parties would be likely 
to take steps to discover whether the debtor has merged. These 
steps might include checking the publicly available corporate 
records periodically to discover whether particular debtors had 
undergone corporate changes . 
. A .. n incorporation-based choice-of-law rule might facilitate 
the transmission of relevant information to secured parties and 
thereby obviate the need for periodic searches, a point that 
LoPu.cki seems to overlook. For example, once a state links its 
corporate and UCC records, the filing office might, for a fee, rou-
effect of a 1·eincorporation are to change the domicile of a corporation, as a legal 
matter a reincorporation consists of the organization of a new corporation and 
the subsequent mer ger of the old corporation into the new. Legally, the old 
corporation does not change its jurisdiction of incorporation; rather, it ceases to 
exist. The new (surviving) corporation remains liable for debts incnued by the 
old one. 
23. LoPucki, supra note 1, at 590-91. 
29. Icl. at 611-14. The incorporation-based system also provides a means 
for enor tl·a.Dning. !d. a t 603. 
30. !d. ~t 614. Although LoPucki treats a reincorporation as a name 
change, 8. reincorpo:ration terminates the existence of an original corporation. 
See su,prc; note 27 and accompanying text (discussing the legal effect of 
reincorporation) . We prefe2· to think of reincorporations not as name changes 
but rather as transfers of collateral. 
31. LoPucki, supra note 1, at 611 -14. 
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tinely notify the secured party of record that its debtor plans to 
merge. Or corporate law might be amended to accomplish the 
same result indirectly. If, for example, the law prevented a pro-
posed merger from taking effect until outstanding financing 
statements are terminated, the debtor would have little choice 
but to inform the secured party prior to merging. Alternatively, 
the effectiveness of a proposed merger could be conditioned upon 
refiling the outstanding financing statements against the sur-
viving corporation. 
Although LoPucki does not address mergers generally, the 
incorporation-based choice-of-law rule he proposes may help re-
solve some perfection issues that arise in that context. Despite 
having devoted substantial time, the Study Committee was un-
able to reach a consensus on whether a financing statement filed 
against the debtor should remain effective with respect to collat-
eral that a surviving corporation acquires after merging with 
the non-surviving debtor. 32 Part of the Committee's disagree-
ment stemmed from diverging views over whether to impose 
upon a post-merger lender to the surviving entity the burden of 
discovering a financing statement filed against the now-defunct 
debtor, or whether to impose upon the lender to the debtor the 
burden to discover that its borrower has merged out of existence 
and to correct the UCC records. Those with concern for the 
searcher note that although the merger and the identity of the 
debtor (including its state of incorporation) may be part of the 
public record, the location of the debtor's chief executive office, 
where a relevant financing statement might be filed, is not. 
Under an incorporation-based regime, however , the burden on 
potential lenders to the surviving entity would be considerably 
reduced.33 
As with initial filings, the benefits of an incorporation-based 
rule with r espect to maintaining perfected status are apparent. 
There are, however, some disadvantages . Chief among them is 
that an incorporation-based choice-of-law rule may engender 
complex substantive rules that depend on whether the debtor is 
a registered entity, or a particular type of registered entity. Fo:r 
example, LoPucki suggests that an incorpo:ratior1-based :rule 
would obviate the need to refile when the debtor eorpo:rat ion 
32. PEB REPORT, supra note 2, §§ 17.E-F. This question assumes that a 
security has attached to the property acquired after the merge;_-. 
33. The fact that UCC filings vastly outnumber seaTches of t he UCC 
records, see LoPucki, supra note 1, at 615, also argues for imposing the burden 
on lenders to the survivor rather than on those who have filed against the 
debtor. 
. l 
1 
l 
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changes its name; presumably, the need to refile to maintain 
perfected status would remain with respect to debtors other 
than registered entities.34 Similarly, under an incorporation-
based rule , a refiling might not be necessary following a 
reincor poration, whereas it might be required in analogous situ-
ations, such as the incorporation of a limited partnership.35 
These potential statutory wrinkles, although worthy of note, are 
unlikely to impose costs substantial enough to offset the obvious 
advantages of an incorporation-based rule.36 
FROM A MIXED CHOICE-OF LAW REGIME TO A DEBTOR-
BASED SYSTEM: POLITICAL OPPOSITION AND 
LIKELIHOOD OF NONUNIFORMITY 
LoPucki's article is not limited to the question of whether an 
incorporation-based rule is preferable to one based on the 
debtor's chief executive office. The article also provides a useful 
analysis and supporting data that are likely to aid the Drafting 
Committee in evaluating the larger questions : .Are the antici-
pated benefits of a shift from a mixed choice-of-law regime to a 
single debtor-based rule (whether keyed to jurisdiction of incor-
poration or to chief executive office) likely to exceed the expected 
costs? Vlill the state legislatures enact a proposed uniform in-
corporation-based choice-of-law rule? 
The Study Committee's Report raised the unifonnity issue 
by observing that a single choice-of-law rule based upon the 
debtor's chief executive office "may affect dramatically the vol-
ume of :filings in many jurisdictions. The perceived effect may be 
so g-reat as to engender opposition among filing officers in partic-
ular jurisdictions."37 Switching to an incorporation-based sys-
tem noses the issue in even starker terms. The immediate 
:reaction of virtually everyone with whom we have shared 
LoPu cki's proposal is the same: Delaware ;,vill experience a t1ood 
34. The Study Committee contemplated that a new filing generally would 
be needed to continue perfected status following name changes. See PEB RE-
PORT, suora note 2, §§ 17.B-C. The Drafting Committee generally has followed 
~h '"' t ' r< . 't ' 1 " _e i:J uo.y •__,oLl:lillH ee s approacn. 
35. The "incorporation of a partnership," like a reinco:rporation, is a t rans-
fe:r of assets from one entity to a nother. 
36. The tension between drawing fine, but complex, lines and effectuating 
rough justice is a problem that is not uPique to choice-of-law issues. See Steven 
L. HE:ri;3 & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., The Article 9 Study Committee Report: 
.:Strong Signals and l-Iard Choices , 29 IDAHO L. REv. 561, 577-80 (1992-93) (dis-
cussing the tension bet-ween developing a complex set of :ru.les to create cer-
t ai:..'lty of commercial law and maintaining cla.>ity and accessibility). 
37. PEE REPORT, supr c note 2, § 9.A.2. 
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of filings, at the expense of other states. Not so long ago, when 
Louisiana was considering adopting Article 9, the effort to re-
place Louisiana's parish-based recording system with a state-
wide filing system was met with potent, and ultimately 
successful, opposition from local filing officers. Many fear that 
state filing officers would mount the same opposition to the pro-
posed change in choice-of-law rules.38 
Everyone recognizes that, to some extent, this issue is "ame-
nable to empirical clarification."39 Unlike the rest of us, how-
ever, LoPucki began the clarification process. He deserves 
immeasurable credit for compiling and analyzing the data. 
Even if his empiricism fails to carry the day, LoPucki has per-
formed a valuable service by informing what otherwise would 
have been debate premised entirely upon speculation. 
LoPucki's data suggest that other states would lose to Dela-
ware, on average, about five percent of their filings, with an esti-
mated annual revenue approaching two million dollars.40 We 
cannot predict whether the data will persuade an otherwise du-
bious filing officer that fears oflosing substantial revenue to Del-
aware are unwarranted. The sticking point ultimately may turn 
out to be perception rather than fact. We would not be surprised 
to hear that some filing officers "just can't believe" that the loss 
of revenue to Delaware would be as small as LoPucki projects. 
Moreover, the losses that LoPucki projects are averages; some 
states, such a s those that impose a tax on filings, might expect to 
incur a larger than average loss.41 Although LoPucki may well 
be correct that thwarting the imposition of documentary taxes 
by moving to an incorporation-based system would be a good re-
sult for the Article 9 system, officials in states that impose a tax 
might vigorously oppose the change nonetheless. 
The potential r edistribution of revenue is not the only prob-
lem; a reduct ion in the aggregate number of filings in the UCC 
:recor-ds will accom pany t he change from a mixed choice-of-law 
system to a single, debtor-based choice-of-law rule. For exam-
ple, inventory financers who now must perfect by filing in each 
jurisdiction where collateral is locat ed would be able to perfect 
by making a single filing in the jurisdiction of incorporation. 
38. OnB person has questioned whether Delaware's filing syst em has th e 
capacity to process so many more fi lings. 
39. LoPucki, supra note 1, at 584. 
40. Jd. at 639. 
n. See icl. at 630-32. 
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From a cost-savings perspective, the reduction in filings seems 
desirable. But politically, it may add fuel to the fire.42 
The stakes here are much higher than those in the battle 
between state and local filing offices within a state.43 Maintain-
ing different rules on where to file within a state is far from an 
ideal situation. It imposes information-gathering costs on those 
who use the filing system. The third alternative Section 9-
401(1) may require the additional expense of a second filing 
within a single state. Putting aside statutory ambiguities, how-
ever, one can definitively determine "where to file" no matter 
which filing office or offices each state designates.4 4 Not so if 
disgruntled filing officers convince particular states not to adopt 
the proposed uniform choice-of-law rule. With non-uniform 
choice-of-law rules, in many cases no one will know in advance 
which state's law determines whether a security interest is 
perfected.45 
Yet LoPucki flags a potentially even greater problem. Be-
cause corporate debtors often can change their domicile more 
easily than their chief executive office, jurisdictions that adopt 
the uniform incorporation-based choice-of-law rule might com-
pete for incorporations by enacting non-uniform substantive 
r ules favorable to secured parties.46 To some extent, the u ni-
form version could reduce the effect of this non uniformity by di-
vorcing the law governing perfection from the law governing 
42. In the absence of filing data from all 50 states, it may be impossible to 
estimate the number of filings that would be eliminated by moving to a single 
choice-of-law rule. 
43. The three alternative § 9-401(1) urovide a menu from which each state 
may choose how much local filing it wish'es . LoPucki argues for elimination of 
local filing except for real estate related collateral such as :fixtures. LoPucki , 
supra note 1, at 657. As far as we are aware , no individual or group fa vors 
retention of local filing, other than one with a direct or indirect interest in the 
revenues that local filing generates. 
44. We do not mean to trivialize the uncertainty costs caused by ambigui-
ties in the existing formulation of the three alternatives to § 9-401(1). For a 
discussion of the ambiguities, see, e.g., BARKLEY CLARK, THE LAW OF SECURED 
TRA.t'ISACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM CoMMERCIAL ConE§ 2.12, at 2-14L1 to 2-149 
(rev. ed. 1993); JM1ES J. WHITE & RoBERT S. SuMMERS, UNIFORM CoMMERCIAL 
ConE§ 22-14 (3d ed. 1988 & Supp. 1993). 
45. For examples of how this uncertainty can come about, see LoPucb, 
supra note 1, a t 646-47 . 
46. For example, a state might delete § 9-301(1), which subordinates un-
perfected security interests to the rights of certain lien creditors, buyers, and 
transferees. AMERICAN LAw INSTITUTE, UNIFORM CoMMERCIAL CoDE RE\TISED 
ARTICLE 8. INVESTMENT SECURITIES (WITH A.lVIENDMENTS TO -~~'{TI CLE 9. SE-
CURED TRANSACTIONS) (Proposed Final Draft 1994). 
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priorities.47 But this solution, which could exacerbate the 
problems of conflicting priority rules, is far from ideal. 
To date, individual states have largely refrained from 
adopting non-uniform Article 9 choice-of-law provisions. The 
change to an incorporation-based choice-of-law rule presents two 
risks: nonuniformity resulting from particular states refusing 
to shift to an incorporation-based choice-of-law ru le, and 
nonuniformity resulting from particular states adopting non-
uniform rules of substantive law in an effort to attract corpora-
tions. Whether those risks warrant rejection of what othe;wise 
may be a desirable rule is a determination the Drafting Commit-
tee ultimately will have to make. LoPucki's article enables them 
to make it with at least some factual basis. 
TRANSITION PROBLEMS 
Related to the problem of nonuniformity in legislative en-
actments of Section 9-103 or particular substantive pro-visions of 
Article 9 is the nonuniformity that results from delays in adopt-
ing statutory revisions. Nonuniformity of this kind has 
presented problems in the past and will likely do so in the fu-
ture. 48 Even if all states adopt the uniform version t o take effect 
on the same effective date, transition provisions would be neces-
sary to deal with the status of financing statements that >.Nere 
properly filed but not in the jurisdiction of incorpor ation . vV.e 
commend LoPucki for t ackling this problem, and, notwithstan d·· 
ing the federal government's uneven efforts in this regard, 49 vve 
urge all concerned to keep an open mind about a federal choice-
47 . New Article 9 draws this distinction. Compare , e.g., § 9-103(6)(b) 
(1994) (providing that local law generally governs perfection and priorit y of a 
security intet·est in a security certificate located in the jurisdiction) with § 9 -
103(6)(D (providing that the law of the jurisdiction in which the debtor is lo-
cated governs perfection by certain methods). 
48. For example, § 9-103 wa s amended in 1977 to provide that the law Un-
cludirw the conflict oflaws rules) of the iurisd.iction of orgmlization o:fthe issuer 
goverr~s perfection of a security interest" in an uncertificated secu.-ity . The 1972 
version provided that perfection of a security interest in the same collateral is 
governed by the law (including the conflict of laws rules) of the jurisdiction in 
which the debtor is located. The 1994 version contains a set of choice-of~1aw 
rules that differs :from both. See U.C.C. §§ 8-110, 9-103(6) (199<b) . 
49. See, e.g., Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Good Faith Transferees of U.S. Treo. s-
ury Securities and Other Weird Ideas: Making Federal Commercial Law, 23 
LoY. L.A. L. REv. 715 (1993) (criticizing t he United States Treasury De:pmt ·· 
m ent's efforts t o promulgate new regulations cover ing book-entry T:c 2E\su..ry 
securities). 
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of-law statute. 5° Indeed, if federal intervention appears likely, 
NCCUSL might seek to delay legislative consideration of revised 
section 9-103 until Congress has acted.5 1 
PURCHASE MONEY SECURITY INTERESTS 
Another issue that may have implications for uniformity as 
well as for cost reduction is the effect of an incorporation-based 
system on purchase money financing of equipment. The Study 
Committee expressed concern that: 
[a] change to the ''location-of-the-debtor" [i.e., chief executive office] 
rule might require certain financers to teach their personnel how to 
determine where the debtor is located (a determination that may be 
considerably more difficult than determining where the newly-ac-
quired collateral is) and how to prepare and file financing statements 
that satisfy the statutory and regulatory requirements of a larger 
number of jurisdictions. 52 
LoPucki suggests that determining the applicable law by refer-
ence to the jurisdiction of incorporation rather than the chief ex-
ecutive office would ameliorate the problem substantially. The 
jurisdiction of incorporation is verifiable from the public record 
and is information that many purchase money financers obtain 
in the ordinary course of extending credit. Nevertheless, some 
purchase money financers have displayed the same concern 
about the costs of an incorporation-based rule that the Study 
Committee expressed in its Report. 5 3 
LoPucki reports that "[m]any, if not most, UCC filings are 
purchase money security interests created at the time a manu-
facturer or dealer sells the collateral to an end user or re-
taile:r."54 Reducing filing costs for purchase money financers, 
both lenders and sellers, would therefore be a particularly effec-
50. For example, under t he Market Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-
432, § 5, lOLl Stat. 963, 973-75, amending§ 17a of the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78q-1, the Securities and Exchange Commission has the 
power t o issue preemptive federal regulations concerning the transfer and 
pledge of interests in securities. One alternative cWTently under consideration 
by the lVIarket Transactions Advisory Committee (established under the Mar-
ket Reforrn Act of 1990) is a federal choice-of-law rule . 
51 . Cong-.ress might, at the same time, create a filing system for federally 
cha.rtered registered entities . 
52. PEB REPORT, suDra note 2, at 77. 
53. These eoncerns,- which have been expressed to us privately and at 
Dr::;.fting Committee meetings, go not only to the costs attendant to the transi-
tion from one choice-of-law rule to anoth er but also to the costs of operating 
under the incorporation-based rule. 
54. LoPuck:i, supra note 1, at 587. A purchase money financer can obtain 
priority over a competing security interest in the sam e equipment even if the 
competing seemed party is fiTst to file its financing statement . S ee U.C.C. § 9 -
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tive means of reducing the aggregate costs of the filing system. 
LoPucki suggests that the jurisdiction of incorporation may be 
less costly to ascertain than the location of the collateral, but his 
discussion proceeds on the assumption that "the careful secured 
party will want to look at them to be sure they are in the 
state."55 In fact, as a general matter, purchase money financers 
often do not incur the costs associated with visiting the debtor's 
premises to verify the location of collateral. Apparently they do 
not perceive a substantial risk in relying upon the debtor for this 
information. 56 Nevertheless, the cost of verifYing the jurisdic-
tion in which the debtor is incorporated may well be less than 
the costs of being unperfected when the debtor turns out to have 
given incorrect information. Moreover, the switch to a single 
rule, whether based on incorporation or on chief executive office, 
would eliminate any need to determine whether goods are "ordi-
nary goods" or "mobile goods."57 
Determining where to file is not the end of the inquiry. 
Purchase money financers also must incur the costs of discover-
ing and complying with the filing requirements of the appropr i-
ate jurisdiction. Here, LoPucki's data suggest that a ch a nge in 
t he choice-of-law determinant from the current mixed system to 
an incorporation-based system would result in a small (less than 
three percent) increase in the number of out-of-state fi lings 
against corporations .5 8 More refined data, which segregate 
purchase money equipment filings, might show a somewhat dif-
ferent picture. Moreover, LoPucki's analysis treats every out-of-
state filing as equivalent, regardless of which states are involved 
in the transaction. An equipment dealer in Kansas City , Mis-
souri, might, however, not be indifferent between filing in Ka n-
sas and filing in New York. 
312(4) (1994). Thus, purchase money secured parties typically do not search 
the DCC records. 
The extent to which the prevalence of purchase money filings accoun ts for 
the significant disparity between the nur:.:1ber of filings and the number of 
searches is an empirical question well worth pursuing. 
55. LoPucki , supra not e 1, at 593. 
56. One can imagine a clas s of sellers whose business is entirely loca l, such 
th at there is at best a trivial risk that the buyer will remove the goods to a n-
oth er sta te . 
57. Under§ 9-103(l)(b), the law of the jurisdictic,n in which the collateral is 
located governs perfection of a security interest in "ordinary goods ," as defin ed 
in § 9-103(l)(a). In contrast,§ 9-103(3)(b) provides that the law of th e jurisdic-
tion wh ere the debtor is located governs perfection of a security interest in "mo-
bile goods," as defined in § 9-103(3)(a). 
58. LoPucki, supra note 1, at 608. 
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The largest cost associated with an out-of-state filing proba-
bly is the cost of determining how to comply with the peculiar 
formal requirements for an effective financing statement. Some 
of these requirements, such as minimum type size, have been 
created administratively by filing officers. Even nonuniform 
statutory requirements, such as the need for a tax identification 
number, impose additional costs on filers. The most efficient so-
lution, and one that the Drafting Committee is considering, may 
be the development of a standard form of financing statement 
that every jurisdiction will accept for filing. 
Finally, purchase money financers have expressed concern 
about maintaining perfection if the circumstances that deter-
mine the applicable law change after a financing statement has 
been filed. Arguably, the movement of collateral is easier to spot 
than the relocation of a chief executive office, let alone a 
reincorporation, which is largely a paper transaction. But, as 
discussed above, an incorporation-based system can address this 
problem in one or more ways. 59 
COI'-TCLUSION 
Consistent with the Study Committee's recommendation, a 
consensus within the Drafting Committee has emerged in favor 
of a single debtor-based choice-of-law rule for Article 9 filing . 
Professor LoPucki's article pushes the envelope beyond that con-
sensus. He has fashioned a cogent and articulate proposal for 
an incorporation-based choice-of-law rule based on careful anal-
ysis, sound assumptions , and empirical data . That proposal also 
appears to h ave found pr<::liminary support within the Drafting 
Committee. 'I'o be sure, some underbrush stands between 
LoPucki's proposal and statutory enactment; in this Commen-
tary we have sought to illu:rninate it and clear some of it away. 
But as Reporters for the 1.1.\:rt icle 9 revision project, 1Ne appreciate 
enormously the path that Professor LoPucki has opened. 
59. For 8X2L.'1ple , Article 9 might provide that r efiling is not required if the 
debtor merges into another corporation: stat e corporate law might require noti-
fication of secured parties as a condition to m erger; st at e filing offices might 
agree to no ti t)- sectu·ed parties of n1e:-cge:rs ; or priva~e sea~:·ch services r:..11.ight un-
dertake to monitor cm-porate r ecords to discover mergeTs. S ee supra notes 30-
33 and accompanying text (exploring <:~lternative methods of r educing th e bur -
den on secured parties under an ine:orporatio:n-based choice-of-l aw r-ule). 
